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PROCEDURAL RULES UNDER WASHINGTON’S PUBLIC 
RECORDS ACT: THE CASE FOR AGENCY DISCRETION 
William D. Richard 
Abstract: Voters adopted Washington’s Public Records Act (PRA) in 1972 as part of a 
broader ballot measure to enhance openness in state government. The PRA requires state 
government agencies, including statewide agencies and municipalities, to establish 
procedures so that the public can request copies of records agencies generate. The PRA 
exempts certain records from disclosure, and other statutes and case law supply additional 
exemptions. When an agency refuses to disclose records, the requester may ask a court to 
determine whether an exemption applies. If no exemption applies, the court may compel 
disclosure of the records and impose monetary penalties against the non-compliant agency, 
including attorney fees. Under the PRA, courts review denials de novo and in light of 
legislative intent, erring on the side of broad public access. In addition to reviewing denials, 
courts have recently been asked to consider whether an agency’s procedural rules under the 
PRA are reasonable. In analyzing procedural rules, some courts have applied the same broad 
interpretation used for substantive PRA questions, refusing to presume that an agency’s 
procedural regulations are valid despite administrative law and municipal law doctrines 
requiring such a presumption. As a result, courts have imposed heavy penalties on public 
agencies at great taxpayer expense. This Comment argues that courts should presume an 
agency’s procedural rules adopted for purposes of the PRA are valid as long as they are 
consistent with the statute’s mandate. 
INTRODUCTION 
Washington’s Public Records Act (PRA)1 is a “strongly worded 
mandate for broad disclosure of public records.”2 Adopted in 1972,3 the 
PRA gives interested members of the public the opportunity to access 
documents reflecting the inner workings of state and municipal agencies. 
                                                     
1. In this Comment, “Public Records Act” and “PRA” refer to the legislation currently found at 
title 42, chapter 56 of the Revised Code of Washington. As discussed infra, what is now the PRA 
was adopted as part of a broader public-disclosure statute. See Initiative Measure No. 276, ch. 1, 
§§ 25–34, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 1, 21–25 (1972). The PRA, along with the rest of this larger 
statute, was initially codified at title 42, chapter 17 of the Revised Code of Washington. In 2005, the 
Legislature transferred the public-records legislation to a new chapter, renumbered the sections, and 
restyled them as the Public Records Act. See Act of May 4, 2005, ch. 274, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 
893. Opinions and other court documents predating the re-codification on July 1, 2006, id. § 502, 
1992 Wash. Sess. Laws at 1031, frequently refer to the old numbering scheme. Throughout this 
Comment, where a source referred to the old numbering scheme, the reference has been altered to 
reflect the new numbering scheme. 
2. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 127, 580 P.2d 246, 249 (1978). 
3. Initiative Measure No. 276, ch. 1, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 1, 31 (1972). 
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The PRA requires agencies to make certain records available for 
inspection and copying, subject to limitations in the PRA itself and rules 
adopted by the agencies themselves.4 When an agency denies access to a 
record based on one of the PRA’s disclosure exemptions, the requester 
may seek judicial review of that decision.5 In reviewing agency denials, 
courts have generally been mindful of the Washington Legislature’s 
declared intent to ensure broad access to public records.6 As a result, 
courts construe the PRA’s disclosure provisions broadly and its 
exemptions narrowly. 
Historically, courts focused primarily on interpreting the PRA’s 
disclosure and exemption provisions.7 Only recently have litigants asked 
courts to consider the reasonableness of agency procedural rules and 
policies adopted to protect agency functions.8 Faced with difficult facts 
and lacking clear guidance, state courts have taken different approaches 
to interpreting agency rules. As a result, some courts have imposed large 
awards against agencies, including attorney fees and daily statutory 
penalties. Taxpayers, in turn, ultimately pay these penalties through 
increased burdens on agency budgets.9 
This Comment argues that, unlike the courts’ approach to interpreting 
the substantive disclosure and exemption provisions of the PRA, courts 
should defer to an agency’s own determination that its PRA procedures 
are reasonable. Part I discusses the PRA’s history and relevant operative 
provisions. Part II examines the statutory mandate the PRA imposes on 
agencies, including a duty to adopt procedural rules as well as the duty 
to disclose records. Part III looks at agency procedural rules under the 
PRA in the broader context of administrative and municipal law. Part IV 
examines Washington courts’ contradictory approaches to interpreting 
agencies’ procedural rules under state administrative procedure law. Part 
V argues that, although the voters and the Legislature created a broad 
mandate for disclosure of public records, the breadth of that mandate 
should not overcome the rule of judicial deference to an agency’s 
                                                     
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2008) (establishing duty to make records available); id. 
§ 42.56.100 (requiring agencies to adopt procedures for providing public access to public records).  
5. Id. § 42.56.550. 
6. See Livingston v. Cedeno, 164 Wash. 2d 46, 50, 186 P.3d 1055, 1057 (2008) (citing 
Hangartner v. City of Seattle, 151 Wash. 2d 439, 450, 90 P.3d 26, 31 (2004)); Progressive Animal 
Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 251, 884 P.2d 592, 597 (1994). See generally 
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2008) (requiring disclosure provisions to be construed broadly and 
exemptions to be construed narrowly).  
7. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
8. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
9. See examples infra Part IV.C. 
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interpretation of its own procedural rules. Courts should presume that 
such rules are valid for purposes of the PRA because doing so avoids 
serious pragmatic problems without violating legislative intent. 
I. THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT IS A STRONGLY WORDED 
MANDATE FOR BROAD DISCLOSURE OF PUBLIC 
RECORDS 
In 1972, Washington voters approved what is now the Public Records 
Act10 as part of a sweeping measure designed to minimize secrecy and 
expose corruption in state government.11 The PRA created a procedural 
and substantive regime under which, with a few limited exemptions, 
government documents are subject to disclosure upon request.12 The 
PRA allows both state and local agencies to establish procedures for 
members of the public to obtain government records.13 
A. Voters Adopted the Public Records Act as Part of an Open 
Government Measure 
Initiative 276 (I-276) was put to Washington voters on the November 
1972 general election ballot.14 The bulk of I-276 dealt with campaign 
finance disclosures.15 It established a public disclosure commission,16 
required political candidates to disclose the source and amounts of all 
campaign contributions,17 compelled lobbyists to register with the state 
government,18 and obligated government officials to disclose certain 
financial interests.19 
                                                     
10. See supra note 1. 
11. See Initiative Measure No. 276, ch. 1, § 1, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 1, 1–2 (1972). 
12. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070 (2008) (establishing duty to make records available); id. 
§ 42.56.100 (requiring agencies to establish procedures). 
13. See id. § 42.56.070 (establishing duty to make records available); id. § 42.56.100 (requiring 
agencies to establish procedures). 
14. Initiative Measure No. 276, ch. 1, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws 1, 31 (1972). 
15. Id. §§ 3–14, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 5–12 (requiring disclosure of campaign contributions); 
§§ 15–23, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 12–18 (requiring registration of lobbyists and barring lobbyists 
from certain activities); § 24, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 18–20 (requiring elected officials and 
family members to disclose financial transactions). 
16. Id. §§ 35–37, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 25–27. 
17. Id. § 8, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 7–9. 
18. Id. § 15, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 12–13. 
19. Id. § 24, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 18–20. 
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The initiative also required the state to provide public access to 
government records.20 In the state’s official 1972 voters’ pamphlet, the 
initiative’s proponents stated that the public records provisions would 
make “all public records and documents in state and local agencies 
available for public inspection and copying,” with exceptions “to protect 
individual privacy and safeguard essential governmental functions.”21 
The initiative’s opponents, however, went into more detail: 
[Initiative] 276 doesn’t tell the taxpayer about added cost of 
government. Virtually every office of State and Local 
Government will incur added expenses—staff, office space, 
files, supplies and computer time—at a conservatively estimated 
cost of more than $2 million dollars [sic] annually. . . . It is 
impossible to estimate the potential cost to State, County and 
City Government of making all public records available for 
inspection and copying.22 
In addition to I-276, the Legislature placed two competing public 
disclosure measures on the same ballot;23 however, I-276 superseded 
both of them24 and passed with seventy-two percent of the vote,25 taking 
effect on January 1, 1973.26 
B. The Public Records Act Prescribes Both Substantive and 
Procedural Rules for Access to Government Records 
The PRA applies to most government agencies at the state, regional, 
county, and city levels.27 Several of its provisions also apply to clerks of 
the legislative houses.28 The clerks maintain “public records” subject to 
                                                     
20. Id. §§ 25–32, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 21–25 (requiring agencies to make public records 
available for inspection and copying). 
21. WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTERS PAMPHLET (GENERAL ELECTION TUESDAY, 
NOVEMBER 7, 1972) 10 (1972) [hereinafter VOTERS PAMPHLET]. 
22. Id. at 11. 
23. Id. at 66–69 (Referendum Bill 24, regulating lobbying activities); id. at 69–74 (Referendum 
Bill 25, regulating campaign-finance activities and requiring candidates for office and groups 
supporting and opposing ballot measures to disclose financial information). 
24. Initiative Measure No. 276 § 50, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 30–31 (repealing both 
Referendum Bill 24 and Referendum Bill 25). 
25. See Wash. Sec’y of State, Initiatives to the People – 1914 through 2009, http://www.sos. 
wa.gov/elections/initiatives/statistics_initiatives.aspx (last visited May 31, 2010). The November 
1972 general-election ballot had the most measures of any statewide ballot up to that time. See 
VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 21, at 3 (“an all time record”). 
26. Initiative Measure No. 276 § 49, 1973 Wash. Sess. Laws at 30. 
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(1) (2008).  
28. E.g., id. § 42.56.010(2) (incorporating certain legislative records and administrative records 
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the PRA,29 but the Legislature has authority to regulate access to records 
to prevent interference with legislative business.30 Certain non-
governmental entities are subject to the PRA if they are “functional 
equivalents” of government agencies, as often occurs in the case of 
outsourcing.31 The PRA does not apply to courts.32 
The PRA requires agencies to disclose any “writing” relating to the 
conduct of government or the performance of any government function, 
whether proprietary or explicitly governmental.33 The PRA also applies 
to certain legislative records.34 The term “writing” encompasses every 
method of recording communications or representations.35 If the 
disclosure of a record would violate a person’s right to privacy, that 
record is exempt from disclosure.36 
Agencies must follow certain procedures set by the PRA regarding 
public-disclosure requests. Agencies are required, for example, to make 
their public records available during customary office hours.37 Each 
agency must also designate a public records officer to serve as a point of 
contact38 and publish indexes for certain documents, such as adjudicative 
opinions and correspondence relating to policy matters.39 Agencies are 
                                                     
generated by the Legislature within the definition of “public records”); id. § 42.56.070(9) (limiting 
the powers of the Secretary and the Chief Clerk to sell records for commercial purposes); id. 
§ 42.56.090 (requiring the Secretary and the Chief Clerk, along with state and local agencies, to post 
hours for access to records on their web sites); id. § 42.56.100 (requiring the Secretary and the Chief 
Clerk to adopt access procedures consistent with the resource limitations associated with legislative 
sessions). 
29. See id. § 42.56.010(2); id. § 40.14.100 (defining “legislative records” as “public records” 
subject to the PRA). 
30. Id. § 42.56.100 (permitting Secretary and Chief Clerk to adopt rules and regulations 
governing access to records, allowing for time, resource, and personnel constraints associated with 
legislative sessions). 
31. See Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash. App. 185, 191–92, 181 
P.3d 881, 884–85 (2008) (citing Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm’rs, 95 Wash. App. 149, 
162, 974 P.2d 886, 893–94 (1999)). 
32. City of Federal Way v. Koenig, 167 Wash. 2d 341, 345–46, 217 P.3d 1172, 1173–74 (2009) 
(holding that courts are not included in the PRA’s definition of “agency”). 
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2008) (establishing duty to make public records available 
for inspection and copying); id. § 42.56.010(2) (defining “public record”). 
34. Id. § 42.56.010(2) (defining “public record” as including certain records maintained by the 
Legislature). 
35. Id. § 42.56.010(3) (defining “writing,” which includes “pictures and sounds, and the means by 
which they may be recorded, such as audio or video recording and magnetic or optical media”). 
36. See id. §§ 42.56.210–.480 (listing statutory exemptions). 
37. Id. § 42.56.090. Regardless of the agency’s customary hours, however, records must be 
available for inspection at least thirty hours per week. Id. 
38. Id. § 42.56.580(1).  
39. Id. § 42.56.070(3). But see id. § 42.56.070(4) (excusing agencies from this requirement where 
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also required to make their copying facilities available to members of the 
public for copying records.40 
II. THE PRA REQUIRES AGENCIES TO DISCLOSE RECORDS 
PROMPTLY UNDER PROCEDURAL RULES 
PROMULGATED BY THE AGENCY 
In addition to the procedural rules defined in the PRA itself, agencies 
also adopt their own PRA procedural rules and regulations to ensure 
prompt compliance with the disclosure requirements while protecting 
records and limiting interference with other agency functions.41 Once an 
agency receives a public-disclosure request, it has a duty to respond 
promptly, either by providing the record, denying access to it, or 
providing a reasonable estimate of the time required to fill the request.42 
If the agency denies access to the records, the requester may seek de 
novo review in superior court.43 If the requester prevails in court, he or 
she is entitled to recover attorney fees, court costs, and per diem 
statutory penalties assessed against the agency.44 
A. Agencies Adopt Procedural PRA Rules Consistent with the PRA’s 
Mandate 
In addition to the procedural limits spelled out in the PRA, agencies 
may adopt procedural rules to prevent records requests from interfering 
excessively with other essential agency functions.45 Additionally, 
agencies must establish rules and regulations to protect public records 
from damage or disorganization.46 Agency rules must be “consonant 
with the intent of [the PRA] to provide full public access to public 
records,” and must “provide for the fullest assistance to inquirers and the 
most timely possible action on requests for information.”47 All 
procedural rules established under the PRA must be reasonable.48 
In 2005, the Legislature directed the Attorney General of Washington 
                                                     
it is unduly burdensome).  
40. Id. § 42.56.080. 
41. Id. § 42.56.100. 
42. Id. § 42.56.520. 
43. Id. § 42.56.550. 
44. Id. 
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to produce a model code for state and local agencies and to adopt a set of 
“best practices” for agency compliance with the PRA.49 The model rules 
offer some guidance for agencies in structuring their internal 
organization, public records storage, and disclosure systems.50 Portions 
of the model rules have fill-in-the-blank provisions that agencies can 
adopt as their own.51 No court has yet considered whether these model 
rules meet the PRA’s reasonableness requirement. 
State agencies are required to publish their procedural rules in the 
Washington Administrative Code.52 Local agencies must prominently 
display their procedural rules and make them available for inspection 
and copying.53 Where the PRA requires regulations or requirements to 
be published or displayed and the agency fails to do so, requesters 
cannot be required to follow any such procedural rule.54 Where the PRA 
and another statute conflict, the PRA prevails.55 
B. Agencies Must Answer Disclosure Requests Promptly 
Agencies must respond to public-disclosure requests “promptly.”56 
Within five business days, the agency must provide the requested 
records, deny the request, or provide a “reasonable” estimate of the time 
needed to fill the request.57 The agency may announce that it needs more 
time if it needs to clarify which records were requested, locate and 
assemble the requested records, notify third persons whose interests may 
be affected,58 or determine whether a disclosure exemption applies.59 
                                                     
49. Act of May 16, 2005, ch. 483, § 4, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 2043, 2045 (codified at WASH. 
REV. CODE § 42.56.570 (2008)) (relating to public disclosure). 
50. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 44-14-00001 to -04004 (2009). 
51. E.g., id. § 44-14-020 (providing space for agency description, contact information, and 
designation of public-records officer). 
52. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.040(1) (2008). 
53. Id. No cases have interpreted the “prominent display” language of the PRA; it is unclear 
whether this would include publication in a municipal code, posting on a website, or something else 
altogether. Because the parallel provision for state agencies allows for publication in the 
Washington Administrative Code, which necessarily invokes the rule-making provisions of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, publication in a similar code volume by a local agency may be a 
sufficiently prominent display. See id. §§ 34.05.310–.395. 
54. Id. § 42.56.040(2). 
55. Id. § 42.56.030 (“In the event of conflict between the provisions of this chapter and any other 
act, the provisions of this chapter shall govern.”). 
56. Id. § 42.56.520. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. Such third persons may then seek an injunction against disclosure. Id. § 42.56.540. 
59. Id. § 42.56.520. 
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If an agency denies access to records, a written explanation must 
accompany the denial.60 The denial statement must be “specific.”61 
Generally, it must cite the specific provisions of law that make the 
document exempt.62 Once the agency denies the request, it must provide 
for a prompt review of the denial.63 Even if the agency does not provide 
review, a denial is considered final after two business days.64 
C. Requesters Whose Public-Records Requests Are Denied May Seek 
Judicial Review 
If an agency denies a public-records request, the requester may take 
further steps that depend upon whether the agency is a state or a local 
entity. Requesters of both state and local agency records may seek 
judicial review in superior court within one year of the denial.65 People 
seeking records from state agencies may also ask the Attorney General 
for an opinion as to whether the requested record is exempt.66 
The PRA allows judicial review in either of two situations: where an 
agency has denied a request for records,67 or where a requester believes 
that an agency’s estimate of the time required to fill a records request is 
unreasonably long.68 Courts review agency actions de novo,69 and 
requesters may seek relief in the county in which the agency maintains 
the record or, where the agency is a county, in certain neighboring 
counties.70 In a judicial-review proceeding, the agency has the burden of 
proving that an exemption applies or that the agency cannot disclose the 
record by law.71 
The judicial-review provision applies to any situation in which an 
agency has “denied [a requester] an opportunity to inspect or copy a 
                                                     
60. Id. 
61. Id.  
62. Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 270, 884 P.2d 592, 
607 (1994). 
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.520 (2008). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. § 42.56.550. 
66. Id. § 42.56.530. 
67. Id. § 42.56.550(1). 
68. Id. § 42.56.550(2). 
69. Id. § 42.56.550(3). 
70. Id. § 42.56.550(1)–(2); id. § 42.56.550(5) (citing id. § 36.01.050 (allowing suits against 
counties to be commenced either in the superior court of the county or in the superior courts of the 
two nearest judicial districts)). 
71. Id. § 42.56.550(1)–(2). 
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public record.”72 Thus, it applies even where an agency has not explicitly 
denied a request; failing to provide a record within the statutory period is 
considered a de facto denial.73 The judicial-review provision does not 
specifically address the situation where a requester has been “denied an 
opportunity to inspect or copy a public record” as a result of the 
requester’s failure to comply with a duly posted agency rule.74 
When a requester prevails on judicial review, that person is entitled to 
a monetary award.75 The award must include all costs incurred in 
connection with bringing the action, including reasonable attorney 
fees.76 The court is also required to award to a prevailing requester a 
penalty of between $5 and $100 for each day that records were 
withheld.77 The penalty award is mandatory, even without evidence of 
bad faith or unreasonable conduct,78 but the per diem amount of the 
award falls within the superior court’s discretion.79 
III. EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE AND MUNICIPAL LAW 
REQUIRES COURTS TO DEFER TO AGENCY RULES AND 
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES 
State agencies adopt PRA procedures under Washington’s 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),80 while local agencies adopt them 
                                                     
72. Id. § 42.56.550(1). 
73. Id. § 42.56.520; Doe I v. Wash. State Patrol, 80 Wash. App. 296, 303, 908 P.2d 914, 918 
(1996) (holding that the state patrol’s failure to reply to request within the statutory period was a 
denial of the request de facto). 
74. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550 (2008). 
75. Id. § 42.56.550(4). 
76. Id. Attorney fees are calculated on a lodestar basis. West v. Port of Olympia, 146 Wash. App. 
108, 122, 192 P.3d 926, 933 (2008) (citing Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wash. 2d 398, 433, 957 P.2d 632, 
651 (1998) (providing that computation of attorney fees is by “lodestar method” of multiplying the 
reasonable number of hours expended by a reasonable hourly rate)). 
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550(4) (2008). Before 1992, the amount was between zero and 
$25 per day, and the decision of whether or not to assess a penalty was within the sound discretion 
of the superior court. See Yacobellis v. City of Bellingham, 64 Wash. App. 295, 299, 825 P.2d 324, 
327 (1992). 
78. Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wash. 2d 25, 36, 929 P.2d 389, 395 (1997) (stating that 
requester need not show bad faith in order to recover statutory penalty). 
79. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550(4) (2008); see Citizens for Fair Share v. State Dep’t of Corr., 
117 Wash. App. 411, 437, 72 P.3d 206, 220 (2003) (quoting Yousoufian v. Office of Sims, 114 
Wash. App. 836, 847, 60 P.3d 667, 672 (2003), rev’d in part on other grounds, 152 Wash. 2d 421, 
98 P.3d 463 (2004)) (stating that appellate review of amount of costs and statutory penalties is for 
abuse of discretion). 
80. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 34.05.001–.903 (2008). 
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under their charters and state law.81 Outside the PRA context, duly-
adopted agency rules and ordinances are presumed valid by courts. This 
presumption is based upon both statutory authority and a well-developed 
body of case law relating to administrative agencies and municipalities. 
A. State Agencies Enact PRA Regulations Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act 
The APA prescribes the method by which state agencies adopt 
regulations and adjudicate disputes within their respective mandates. Its 
procedures apply equally to regulations implementing the PRA as they 
do to the other regulations an agency adopts.82 
Under the APA, state agencies adopt regulations through a notice-
and-comment process.83 In the typical case, agencies publish proposed 
rules in the Washington State Register.84 A proposed rule must include 
the statutory authority for the rule; a short explanation of the rule; and 
agency comments or recommendations regarding statutory provisions, 
implementation, enforcement, and fiscal matters.85 The agency must then 
give interested members of the public an opportunity to make comments 
on the proposed regulation, including oral comments made during a 
public hearing.86 The agency may adopt the rule only after considering 
the public’s submitted comments.87 If the final rule varies substantially 
from the proposed rule, the agency must either supplement its public 
notice-and-comment process or start the rulemaking process anew.88 
Much of the information the agency produces relating to the rulemaking 
                                                     
81. See id. § 34.05.220 (permitting state agencies to adopt procedural rules under the state’s 
Administrative Procedure Act); WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11 (permitting municipalities to adopt 
regulations not in conflict with general laws); see also Branson v. Port of Seattle, 152 Wash. 2d 862, 
870, 101 P.3d 67, 71 (2004) (citing 2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS § 10:5 (Thomson West, 3d ed., rev. vol. 2006)). 
82. See WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.010(16) (defining “rule” as “any agency order, directive, or 
regulation of general applicability . . . (c) which establishes, alters, or revokes any qualification or 
requirement relating to the enjoyment of benefits or privileges conferred by law”); see also id. 
§ 42.56.040 (requiring state agencies to publish their rules of procedure in the Washington 
Administrative Code); id. § 34.05.210 (requiring the Code Reviser to publish the Washington 
Administrative Code, which must contain “[a]ll current, permanently effective rules of each 
agency”). 
83. See id. §§ 34.05.310–.395. 
84. Id. § 34.05.320. 
85. Id.  
86. Id. § 34.05.325. 
87. Id. § 34.05.335(2). 
88. Id. § 34.05.340. 
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process, including all public submissions, is included in a rulemaking 
file that becomes part of the record upon which judicial review is 
based.89 
State agencies must promulgate their PRA procedural regulations in 
accordance with the methods outlined in the APA.90 For example, 
Western Washington University recently deleted its old PRA procedural 
rules and adopted new ones conforming with the Attorney General’s 
model rules.91 The University proposed the rule in the Washington 
Register,92 ordered it adopted in a board-of-trustees meeting,93 and 
published the final rule in the Washington Register.94 This was all done 
in accordance with the trustees’ statutory authority,95 the PRA’s 
mandate, and the APA’s procedural rules.96 The new PRA regulation 
describes the University’s internal structure and designates a public-
records officer,97 creates a procedure for inspecting and requesting 
public records,98 and lists some statutory exemptions to disclosure 
specified outside the PRA.99 
B. Municipal Entities Adopt PRA Ordinances in Accordance with 
Their Charters or State Law 
Like state agencies, local agencies adopt PRA procedural rules using 
formal procedures. Municipalities—including counties, cities, and 
towns—enact ordinances in connection with their charters or general 
provisions in the Revised Code of Washington.100 PRA procedural rules 
                                                     
89. Id. § 34.05.370. 
90. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
91. WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 516-09-010 to -080 (2009) (establishing university procedural 
rules); id. §§ 44-14-00001 to -08004 (establishing Attorney General’s model rules). 
92. 07-19 Wash. Reg. 115 (proposed Sept. 18, 2007). 
93. Minutes of the Bd. of Trs. of W. Wash. Univ. at 4588–89 (Dec. 14, 2007), available at 
http://content.wwu.edu/u?/BOTmin,4099; 08-01 Wash. Reg. 164, 164 (Dec. 18, 2007) (citing order 
of adoption). 
94. 08-01 Wash. Reg. 164 (Dec. 18, 2007) (codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 516-09) (final 
rule). 
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 28B.35.120(12) (2008) (granting university trustees authority to 
promulgate rules and regulations deemed necessary). 
96. Id. § 42.56.100 (requiring agencies to adopt public-records rules and regulations). 
97. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 516-09-020 (2009). 
98. Id. § 516-09-030. 
99. Id. § 516-09-060. 
100. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.32.120(7) (2008) (granting county legislative authorities the 
power to “make and enforce . . . all such police and sanitary regulations as are not in conflict with 
state law”); id. § 36.01.010 (listing county corporate powers); id. § 36.32.005 (stating that county 
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are adopted in the form of ordinances and resolutions and, therefore, 
have the force of law.101 
The Washington State Constitution grants municipalities the power to 
adopt “police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with 
general laws.”102 Commentators have noted, and case law has illustrated, 
that municipalities exercise their powers in two distinct modes: 
governmental and proprietary.103 Courts generally interpret proprietary 
powers more liberally than governmental powers.104 Governmental 
functions are “those conferred on a municipal corporation . . . to be 
employed in administering the affairs of the state and promoting the 
public welfare generally.”105 Proprietary powers, on the other hand, are 
“those relating to the accomplishment of private corporate purposes in 
which the public is only indirectly concerned.”106 PRA regulations might 
fall into the latter category because they define how the municipality 
will protect its records and prevent interference with its operations.107 On 
the other hand, local agencies generate records as part of their 
governmental functions to promote public welfare and administer the 
affairs of the state. No Washington court has squarely addressed in 
which category PRA regulations belong, and as a result the courts have 
                                                     
powers can only be carried out by county commissioners or officers acting with legal authority); id. 
§ 35.22.020 (stating that first-class cities shall exercise their powers, functions, and duties in 
accordance with their charters); id. § 35.23.010 (listing corporate powers of a second-class city); id. 
§ 35.23.211 (specifying the requisites of a valid ordinance in a second-class city); id. § 35.27.370(1) 
(empowering town councils to pass ordinances not in conflict with state or federal law); id. 
§ 35.27.010 (listing town corporate powers); id. § 35A.11.020 (granting to the legislative body of a 
code city the “power to organize and regulate its internal affairs within the provisions of this title 
and its charter, if any”); id. § 35A.11.010 (listing corporate powers of code cities); see also WASH. 
CONST. art. XI, § 11 (granting municipalities the power to make and enforce “police, sanitary, and 
other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws”). 
101. See City of Tacoma v. Lillis, 4 Wash. 797, 802, 31 P. 321, 323 (1892) (“It may be stated as a 
general legal proposition that valid ordinances have the force of laws, and are as binding upon the 
inhabitants of a municipality as are the statutes of the state upon its citizens generally.”) (citing 1 
JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 308 (4th ed. 
1890); Milne v. Davidson, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 409 (La. 1827))). 
102. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11. 
103. See Hugh D. Spitzer, Municipal Police Power in Washington State, 75 WASH. L. REV. 495, 
496 (2000). See generally 2A MCQUILLIN, supra note 81 (collecting cases nationwide). 
104. Branson v. Port of Seattle, 152 Wash. 2d 862, 870, 101 P.3d 67, 71 (2004) (citing 2A 
EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10:22, at 378 (Clark Boardman 
Callaghan, 3d ed., rev. vol. 2, 1996)). 
105. 2A MCQULLIN, supra note 81, at 391. 
106. Id. at 392–93. 
107. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.100 (2008) (requiring procedural rules to protect records and 
ensure that providing records does not interfere with other agency functions). 
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not specified whether a liberal construction of a municipal agency’s 
powers under the PRA is appropriate. 
Municipalities enact ordinances differently depending on whether the 
municipality is a county, a city, or a town, and whether the municipality 
has a charter or is governed by the generic provisions of the Revised 
Code of Washington.108 For example, Snohomish County, which has its 
own charter,109 adopted PRA regulations as ordinances.110 These 
regulations designate a public-records officer, specify that the officer is 
the primary point of contact for PRA requests, and give the officer the 
power to adopt more detailed procedural rules.111 The regulations also 
require departments to designate public-records specialists,112 allow 
informal PRA requests under certain circumstances,113 and specify 
procedures requesters may follow when their requests are denied.114 
Other municipalities have PRA ordinances that direct city officials to 
promulgate regulations to implement the PRA.115 
C. Regulations and Ordinances Are Entitled to a Presumption of 
Validity, Even When They Are Subject to Review De Novo 
Outside the PRA context, courts generally presume that state agency 
regulations and municipal ordinances are valid.116 Washington courts 
invalidate state agency regulations for only four reasons: the rule is 
unconstitutional, exceeds the agency’s statutory authority, was adopted 
outside of the statutory rule-making procedure, or is arbitrary and 
                                                     
108. See supra note 100. 
109. SNOHOMISH COUNTY, WASH., AMENDED CHARTER (2007), available at http://www.co. 
snohomish.wa.us/Documents/Departments/Council/county_code/CountyCharter.pdf. 
110. SNOHOMISH COUNTY, WASH., CODE §§ 2.51.010–.120 (2009), available at http://www.co. 
snohomish.wa.us/Documents/Departments/Council/county_code/CountyCodeTitle2.pdf. 
111. Id. § 2.51.035. 
112. Id. § 2.51.040. 
113. Id. § 2.51.060. 
114. Id. § 2.51.080. 
115. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 3.104.030 (1985) (requiring Seattle city agencies to 
promulgate PRA-compliant procedures); BELLEVUE, WASH., CITY CODE §§ 2.26.005–.080 (1994) 
(authorizing the Bellevue city clerk to promulgate PRA-compliant regulations). 
116. See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 228, at 207 (2004) (explaining that courts presume 
regulations are valid when adopted under a delegation of authority and in conformity with an 
administrative procedure statute); 6 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
§ 20:6, at 33 (3d ed., rev. vol. 2007) (explaining that courts presume municipal ordinances are valid; 
“every intendment will be indulged” in favor of the validity of a municipal ordinance except where 
the ordinance appears to be ultra vires).  
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capricious.117 Washington courts presume that administrative rules 
adopted in both substantive and procedural conformity with applicable 
statutes are valid and will uphold them on judicial review as long as they 
are reasonably consistent with the substantive statute being 
implemented.118 
Courts likewise presume that municipal ordinances are valid.119 
Where local government agencies have discretion, courts should not 
examine the methods by which the agencies exercise that discretion120 
unless an agency’s actions are arbitrary or capricious.121 When local 
governments carry out grants of power, courts construe those grants 
liberally.122 While municipalities cannot act contrary to statutory or 
constitutional provisions,123 municipalities are free to adopt regulations 
within legislated limits.124 Thus, courts typically presume that agency 
regulations and municipal ordinances—including PRA-implementing 
regulations and ordinances—are valid. 
IV. WASHINGTON COURTS HAVE TAKEN CONTRADICTORY 
APPROACHES WHEN REVIEWING AGENCIES’ 
PROCEDURAL RULES UNDER THE PRA 
The jurisprudence that has evolved around the PRA’s substantive 
requirements reflects the Legislature’s stated intent that access to public 
records should be as broad as possible.125 Recent cases have considered 
the reasonableness of agency procedures, as distinct from the substantive 
question of whether a given record is subject to disclosure.126 While the 
Supreme Court of Washington has suggested through dicta that agencies 
                                                     
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(2)(c) (2008).  
118. Campbell v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., 150 Wash. 2d 881, 892, 83 P.3d 999, 
1006 (2004). 
119. Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 144 Wash. 2d 556, 561, 29 P.3d 709, 712 (2001). 
120. Mount Spokane Skiing Corp. v. Spokane County, 86 Wash. App. 165, 178, 936 P.2d 1148, 
1155 (1997) (citing Haga v. City of Seattle, 3 Wash. 2d 31, 39–44, 99 P.2d 623, 626–29 (1940)). 
121. Id. 
122. See City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wash. 2d 679, 692, 743 P.2d 793, 799–
800 (1987) (stating that the rule of strict construction of municipal powers does not apply to “mode 
or means” of carrying out those powers (citing 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 239 (5th ed. 1911))). 
123. Id. at 685–86, 743 P.2d at 796. 
124. Heinsma, 144 Wash. 2d at 561, 29 P.3d at 712. 
125. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2008) (explaining that “[t]his chapter shall be liberally 
construed and its exemptions narrowly construed to promote” public policy favoring broad access to 
public records). 
126. See infra Part IV.C. 
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have discretion in adopting procedural rules under the PRA,127 one 
division of the Court of Appeals of Washington, faced with peculiar 
facts in difficult cases, has applied the PRA’s requirement that its 
exemptions be construed narrowly to the procedural domain.128 
A. Washington Courts Interpret the PRA Broadly to Promote 
Disclosure 
Washington courts have characterized the PRA as “a strongly worded 
mandate for broad disclosure of public records.”129 Consistent with the 
Legislature’s intent that courts interpret the Act’s disclosure provisions 
broadly and its exemptions narrowly,130 the courts generally construe the 
PRA to promote full access to public records.131 Courts avoid 
interpreting the PRA in a way that would tend to frustrate that 
purpose.132 
Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe133 is one of the Supreme Court of 
Washington’s earliest expressions on the judiciary’s role in interpreting 
and applying the PRA. In Hearst Corp., the Court introduced the oft-
cited “strongly worded mandate” language.134 The Seattle Post-
                                                     
127. See infra Part IV.B. 
128. See infra Part IV.C. 
129. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 127, 580 P.2d 246, 249 (1978). 
130. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2008). The Legislature added this liberal-interpretation 
language in 1992 as part of a package of amendments to what is now the PRA. Act of Mar. 31, 
1992, ch. 139,  § 2, 1992 Wash. Sess. Laws 559, 564. The legislative history of the 1992 
amendments discloses the Legislature’s intent to strengthen the record-disclosure provisions and to 
limit the interpretation of the record exemptions; however, the history says nothing about 
interpreting procedural rules. See WASHINGTON HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBSTITUTE HOUSE 
BILL REPORT, H.R. 52-2876, 1992 Reg. Sess., at 2–4 (Feb. 7, 1992). 
131. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Johnson, 135 Wash. 2d 734, 745–46, 
958 P.2d 260, 265 (1998). 
132. Hearst Corp., 90 Wash. 2d at 127, 580 P.2d at 249. 
133. 90 Wash. 2d 123, 580 P.2d 246 (1978). 
134. Id. at 128, 580 P.2d at 249. The Court would go on to cite the same “strongly worded 
mandate” language in numerous cases over the next several decades. See Spokane Police Guild v. 
Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 112 Wash. 2d 30, 33, 769 P.2d 283, 284 (1989); Progressive 
Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 114 Wash. 2d 677, 682, 790 P.2d 604, 606 (1990); 
Dawson v. Daly, 120 Wash. 2d 782, 788, 845 P.2d 995, 999 (1993); Progressive Animal Welfare 
Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 251, 884 P.2d 592, 597 (1994); Servais v. Port of 
Bellingham, 127 Wash. 2d 820, 826, 904 P.2d 1124, 1127 (1995); Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 
Wash. 2d 25, 31, 929 P.2d 389, 392 (1997); Newman v. King County, 133 Wash. 2d 565, 570, 947 
P.2d 712, 714 (1997); Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation v. Johnson, 135 Wash. 2d 
734, 745, 958 P.2d 260, 265 (1998); Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 136 Wash. 2d 595, 603, 963 P.2d 869, 
873 (1998); Guillen v. Pierce County, 144 Wash. 2d 696, 711, 31 P.3d 628, 637 (2001); Prison 
Legal News, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 154 Wash. 2d 628, 635, 115 P.3d 316, 319 (2005); Spokane 
Research & Def. Fund v. City of Spokane, 155 Wash. 2d 89, 100, 117 P.3d 1117, 1123 (2005); 
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Intelligencer had filed a public-records request as part of an investigation 
into whether the King County Assessor had given “special favors” to his 
political supporters.135 The Court held that the courts have the power to 
determine which records are subject to disclosure and when exemptions 
apply.136 The Court did not directly address procedural discretion. Since 
Hearst Corp., courts have construed claims of exemption against 
agencies and in favor of disclosure.137 But Hearst Corp. and most of its 
progeny deal with substantive denials under the PRA; the Hearst Corp. 
opinion does not explicitly address the extent to which courts can or 
should defer to an agency’s PRA-implementing procedural regulations 
and ordinances.138 
B. Although It Has Not Squarely Addressed the Issue, the Supreme 
Court of Washington Has Suggested that Agencies Have Discretion 
in Establishing Public-Records Procedures 
In its Hearst Corp. opinion, the Supreme Court of Washington stated 
in dicta that “[a]gencies are afforded some discretion concerning the 
procedures whereby agency information is made available.”139 In 
subsequent cases, the Court has further defined the extent to which 
agencies should have discretion in adopting procedural rules to protect 
records from destruction and to prevent public-records requests from 
interfering with other essential functions of the agency.140 
The PRA requires that such procedural rules be reasonable,141 and 
recently several court of appeals decisions have examined agency rules 
                                                     
Koenig v. City of Des Moines, 158 Wash. 2d 173, 180, 142 P.3d 162, 168 (2006); Soter v. Cowles 
Pub. Co., 162 Wash. 2d 716, 730, 174 P.3d 60, 68 (2007); Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue 
Sch. Dist., 164 Wash. 2d 199, 209, 189 P.3d 139, 144 (2008); Yousoufian v. Office of Sims, 165 
Wash. 2d 439, 457, 200 P.3d 232, 239 (2009), modified on reconsideration, 168 Wash. 2d 444, 229 
P.3d 735 (2010); Rental Hous. Ass’n of Puget Sound v. City of Des Moines, 165 Wash. 2d 525, 
527, 199 P.3d 393, 394 (2009); City of Federal Way v. Koenig, 167 Wash. 2d 341, 355, 217 P.3d 
1172, 1179 (2009). 
135. Hearst Corp., 90 Wash. 2d at 126, 580 P.2d at 248. 
136. Id. at 130, 580 P.2d at 250. 
137. See Livingston v. Cedeno, 164 Wash. 2d 46, 50, 186 P.3d 1055, 1057 (2008); Yousoufian v. 
Office of Sims, 152 Wash. 2d 421, 429, 98 P.3d 463, 467 (2004); Confederated Tribes of the 
Chehalis Reservation v. Johnson, 135 Wash. 2d 734, 735–36, 958 P.2d 260, 265 (1998); Progressive 
Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wash. 2d 243, 251, 884 P.2d 592, 597 (1994). 
138. See infra Part IV.B. 
139. Hearst Corp., 90 Wash. 2d at 129, 580 P.2d at 250. 
140. See, e.g., Livingston v. Cedeno, 164 Wash. 2d at 57, 186 P.3d at 1060 (holding that the 
Department of Corrections had the power to adopt a mail policy incidentally limiting inmate access 
to public records delivered by mail). 
141. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.100 (2008). 
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and regulations under that standard.142 These cases adopt varying 
approaches, but no court considering the issue has addressed the 
threshold matter of whether courts should defer to agencies’ 
implementation of PRA procedural rules and, if so, how much. Instead, 
some courts have applied, without discussion, the same standard of 
review to procedural questions that they have applied in cases of 
substantive denials. 
C. The Court of Appeals Has Applied Varying Standards of Review to 
Questions of Procedural Rules Implemented Under the PRA 
In Zink v. City of Mesa,143 a city councilwoman (formerly mayor) of 
Mesa, Washington, and her husband filed about 170 public-disclosure 
requests with the city between July 2002 and January 2005.144 Many of 
these requests related to a building-permit dispute with the city.145 The 
councilwoman described herself as a “watchdog type,” and when the 
city resisted her requests, she argued that the resistance was due to 
resentment of her watchdog activities.146 At a judicial-review hearing 
under the PRA, the trial court heard live testimony from the city clerk 
that the councilwoman told her “‘you better do this,’ ‘look this up,’ and 
‘if you don’t do this just right, I’m gonna sue ya.’”147 
The clerk’s office limited the councilwoman’s access to public 
records to one hour per day because complying with her voluminous 
PRA requests was interfering with the office’s other responsibilities.148 
Despite that limitation, the trial court found that the city “more than 
substantially complied” with the requests.149 The court was not 
persuaded by the councilwoman’s claim that the clerk would have acted 
more expeditiously for someone else.150 The court of appeals reversed, 
holding that the clerk’s limitation violated the PRA.151 The court cited 
Hearst Corp. for the proposition that “substantial compliance” with the 
PRA is insufficient and that administrative inconvenience cannot excuse 
                                                     
142. See infra Part IV.C. 
143. 140 Wash. App. 328, 166 P.3d 738 (2007). 
144. Id. at 333, 166 P.3d at 740. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 333–334, 166 P.3d at 740. 
147. Id. at 343, 166 P.3d at 745. 
148. Id. at 339, 166 P.3d at 744. 
149. Id. at 335, 166 P.3d at 741. 
150. Id. at 341–42, 166 P.3d at 744. 
151. Id. at 341, 166 P.3d at 744. 
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a lack of strict compliance,152 even though Hearst Corp. stated that 
administrative efficiency was relevant to PRA procedural 
considerations.153 The Zink court also held that the PRA requires that 
offices remain open for inspection of records during certain hours of the 
day and that the agency cannot shorten those hours.154 
In Neighborhood Alliance of Spokane County v. County of 
Spokane,155 an alliance of concerned residents discovered an office 
seating chart containing the first names of two persons whom the 
county’s planning department had not yet hired.156 Suspecting that the 
county was engaging in illegal hiring practices, the alliance filed a 
public-disclosure request for all draft seating charts for the department in 
question.157 The county provided the draft seating charts as requested.158 
The alliance then requested the names of the employees in question and 
the file-creation date of one of the draft seating charts.159 The county 
provided the requested information—including the file-creation date, 
which was later than the date on the chart itself.160 As it turned out, the 
employee’s computer on which the seating chart had been created had 
been replaced with a newer computer, and the old computer’s hard drive 
had been wiped.161 
The alliance filed suit, seeking to compel disclosure of the original 
seating chart.162 The county successfully moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that it had provided the requested file-creation date.163 The court 
of appeals reversed, holding that the county’s search procedure was not 
sufficiently detailed to produce records that would respond to the 
alliance’s request and that the procedure was therefore inadequate for 
PRA purposes.164 In reaching this conclusion, the court principally relied 
                                                     
152. Id. at 338, 166 P.3d at 743 (citing Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash. 2d 123, 140, 580 P.2d 
246, 255 (1978)).  
153. Hearst Corp., 90 Wash. 2d at 131–32, 580 P.2d at 252. 
154. Zink, 140 Wash. App. at 341, 166 P.3d at 744 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.090 (2008) 
(requiring that public records be available for inspection during the customary office hours of the 
agency; before 1995, these hours were at least 9 a.m. to 12 p.m. and 1 p.m. to 4 p.m.)). 
155. 153 Wash. App. 241, 224 P.3d 775 (2009). 
156. Id. at 246–47, 224 P.3d at 778. 
157. Id. at 247, 224 P.3d at 778. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 248, 224 P.3d at 778–79. 
160. Id. at 249, 224 P.3d at 779. 
161. Id. at 249–51, 224 P.3d at 779–80. 
162. Id. at 251, 224 P.3d at 780. 
163. Id. at 252, 224 P.3d at 780. 
164. Id. at 265, 224 P.3d at 787. 
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upon cases analyzing the Freedom of Information Act, the federal 
analogue of Washington’s PRA.165 
In contrast to its decisions in Zink and Neighborhood Alliance, the 
Court of Appeals of Washington deferred to agency procedural rules in 
Parmelee v. Clarke.166 In Parmelee, a prison inmate sued the 
Department of Corrections for failing to respond to his public-disclosure 
requests.167 The inmate had submitted his requests to a grievance 
coordinator at the prison, and the coordinator had responded with 
instructions on how and to whom to submit public-records requests.168 
The inmate did not follow the established procedure, but instead filed 
suit to compel disclosure; he also sought statutory penalties.169 The 
Department of Corrections moved for summary judgment, which the 
trial judge granted after finding that the inmate had been informed of the 
department’s procedures yet had not followed them.170 The court of 
appeals held that the department should not be penalized when an inmate 
fails to follow internal procedures that are publicly available even if they 
are not promulgated as part of the Washington Administrative Code.171 
The Zink, Neighborhood Alliance, and Parmelee courts each 
evaluated the validity of agency rules and policies in response to their 
duties under the PRA. The Parmelee court did not consider the validity 
of the agency’s procedural rules; instead, it presumed validity without 
explicitly saying so. The Neighborhood Alliance court reasoned by 
analogy to federal practice without directly considering how much 
deference to afford an agency’s own procedural rules. The Zink court 
simply incorporated the strict-interpretation provisions of the PRA’s 
substantive disclosure and exemption requirements into the area of PRA 
procedural rules. None of these cases establishes clear guidance for 
courts to follow when reviewing procedural rules adopted under the 
PRA. 
                                                     
165. Id. at 256, 224 P.3d at 783. 
166. 148 Wash. App. 748, 201 P.3d 1022 (2008). 
167. Id. at 750–51, 201 P.3d at 1024. 
168. Id. at 751, 201 P.3d at 1024. 
169. Id. at 752, 201 P.3d at 1024–25. 
170. Id. at 753, 201 P.3d at 1025. 
171. Id. at 759, 201 P.3d at 1028. 
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V. WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD PRESUME THE 
VALIDITY OF AGENCY PROCEDURAL RULES ADOPTED 
UNDER THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 
Given the somewhat confused state of the nascent jurisprudence of 
PRA procedural rules, courts should turn to established administrative 
and municipal jurisprudence and presume the validity of governmental 
rules and regulations. Pragmatic considerations caution against imposing 
attorney fees and statutory penalties for non-disclosure where agencies 
have adopted reasonable rules consistent with the statutory mandate and 
requesters have not followed those rules. The PRA’s text does not 
require liberal interpretation of its procedural provisions; only its 
substantive provisions are subject to the broad reading that courts have 
so far applied. Agency rules are subject to evaluation for reasonableness. 
Thus, absent contrary language in the PRA, courts should presume the 
regulations’ validity. 
A. The Court of Appeals Has Not Considered the Threshold Question 
of Presumptive Validity 
In each of the three PRA procedural cases the Court of Appeals of 
Washington has considered, the court reached its conclusion without 
first determining the appropriate basis for review. In both Zink and 
Parmelee, the court of appeals grafted the de novo standard used for 
substantive denials onto the enforceability of procedural rules.172 
However, the court in Neighborhood Alliance did not consider whether 
the agency’s reasonable procedural rules should receive any deference at 
all. 
When considering the validity of an agency’s PRA procedural rules, 
courts should first consider whether and to what extent they should 
presume that the agency has acted within its statutory discretion. The 
state’s Administrative Procedure Act requires no less respect for the 
actions of the coordinate branches of government.173 While courts may 
not always conclude that agency rules are “reasonable” for PRA 
purposes and may fashion remedies accordingly, their discussion of an 
agency rule’s validity should start with a presumption of validity. Thus, 
                                                     
172. See Zink v. City of Mesa, 140 Wash. App. 328, 335–37, 166 P.3d 738, 741–42 (2007) 
(announcing that the standard of review is de novo; the court of appeals would review the trial 
court’s factual findings for substantial evidence); Parmelee, 148 Wash. App. at 753, 201 P.3d at 
1025 (stating that review of challenged agency actions under the PRA is de novo).  
173. See supra Part III.C. 
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an opponent of an agency rule should bear the burden of demonstrating 
that the rule exceeds the scope of the agency’s discretion. 
B. There Is Little Statutory Basis for Imposing Penalties for Denials 
Stemming From Reasonable Procedural Rules 
The PRA’s judicial-review provision does not address what should 
happen when an agency’s procedural rules are not followed. The 
provision, read as a whole, focuses on substantive denials as opposed to 
procedural denials.174 For example, the judicial-review provision places 
upon agencies the burden of proving that an exemption applies.175 
Nowhere does the text of the PRA, however, equate a procedural rule 
with a substantive exemption.176 
Whereas most non-PRA regulations and ordinances may be struck 
down if they are arbitrary and capricious, procedural rules adopted under 
the PRA are reviewed for reasonableness.177 Additionally, courts review 
de novo those agency actions taken or challenged under the PRA’s 
substantive provisions, which include the provisions directing agencies 
to adopt reasonable rules and regulations.178 Reading the reasonableness 
and de novo requirements together, de novo review of an agency’s 
procedural regulation should focus on the reasonableness of the 
regulation. 
Elsewhere, the PRA places the burden of proving an exemption on the 
agency.179 Nowhere does the PRA equate an agency’s procedural rule 
with a disclosure exemption. Indeed, the PRA gives some presumptive 
weight to the enforceability of procedural rules: procedural rules can 
                                                     
174. See supra Part II.C. 
175. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550(1) (“The burden of proof shall be on the agency to establish 
that refusal to permit public inspection and copying is in accordance with a statute that exempts or 
prohibits disclosure in whole or in part of specific information or records.”). 
176. While the PRA does require that its disclosure provisions be read broadly and its exemptions 
narrowly, the text of the PRA treats the procedural provisions separately from the substantive 
disclosure provisions, and agencies have no discretion to declare a record exempt. Compare WASH. 
REV. CODE § 42.56.100 (2008) (requiring agencies to adopt rules to protect records from damage 
and to avoid interference with essential agency functions), with id. § 42.56.550(1) (stating that 
agencies have the burden of proving that an exemption applies). See also supra note 130 (no 
indication in legislative history of an intent to deprive agencies of procedural discretion in adopting 
rules to protect records and prevent interference with agency functions). 
177. See supra Part I.B. 
178. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.550(3) (2008) (“[R]eview of all agency actions taken . . . under 
RCW 42.56.030 through RCW 42.56.520 shall be de novo.”). This requirement of de novo review 
would therefore include section 100 of this chapter, which requires agencies to adopt and enforce 
reasonable rules. Id. § 42.56.100. 
179. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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bind requesters only if those rules are published in the Washington 
Administrative Code or prominently displayed.180 Logic suggests that 
the converse should be true: requesters must follow procedural rules that 
are published in the Washington Administrative Code or prominently 
displayed, but they may challenge those rules on the basis of 
reasonableness. 
C. Presuming Rule Validity Reflects Legislative Intent and Addresses 
Pragmatic Concerns 
When courts review agency PRA regulations and local ordinances de 
novo for reasonableness, they should presume validity as they do with 
non-PRA rules. The PRA is silent as to what standard of review should 
apply to procedural questions, but the state supreme court has suggested 
that they receive greater deference.181 Furthermore, deferring to agencies 
on procedural matters is consistent with legislative intent favoring 
disclosure. Washington courts review procedural rules to make sure the 
rules do not exceed an agency’s statutory authority.182 Therefore, a court 
reviewing a PRA procedural rule, even presuming that rule is 
reasonable, would still have to consider its reasonableness in light of the 
authority-granting statute: the PRA. 
One example of this kind of deference is the deference courts exercise 
in determining whether an agency has exceeded its statutory mandate. 
When courts examine whether agency actions exceed statutory authority, 
the inquiry is into an error of law, and review is de novo. Courts, 
however, will generally defer to an agency’s view of the law.183 To 
reconcile disparate levels of deference, courts have held that de novo 
review does not lessen the presumption of validity.184 Thus, de novo 
review is compatible with the presumption of validity. 
                                                     
180. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
181. See supra Part IV.B.  
182. See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text. 
183. Franklin County Sheriff’s Office v. Sellers, 97 Wash. 2d 317, 325, 646 P.2d 113, 116–17 
(1982). 
184. See Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty. v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 161 Wash. 
2d 415, 424, 166 P.3d 1198, 1203 (2007) (stating that Growth Management Act hearings board’s 
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo but are entitled to substantial weight with respect to the 
board’s interpretation of the statute); City of Seattle v. Wilson, 151 Wash. App. 624, 628–29, 213 
P.3d 636, 638 (2009) (stating that question of whether a municipal ordinance defining traffic 
infraction which leads to injury or death as misdemeanor assault conflicts with state law is a 
question of law subject to de novo review; the ordinance is presumed valid, and the burden of proof 
is on the challenger to prove otherwise). 
082610 Richard Final.doc (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2010  8:14 AM 
2010] DISCRETION AND WASHINGTON’S PUBLIC RECORDS ACT  515 
 
Pragmatic considerations also favor a deferential standard for 
procedural rules. Courts have imposed large monetary judgments which, 
while encourage broad disclosure, also burden already limited public 
resources and, ultimately, the taxpayers whose interests the PRA is 
meant to protect. On remand, the trial court in Zink v. City of Mesa 
imposed attorney fees, costs, and statutory penalties totaling $239,000, 
nearly a quarter of the city’s annual $1 million in tax revenue, or 
approximately $544 for each of the city’s 440 residents.185 Mesa’s 
annual operating budget is $340,000, and the city is considering filing 
for bankruptcy.186 Other cases have resulted in similar large awards. By 
his own estimation, a south King County man has made between 
$30,000 and $50,000 (net of attorney fees) suing agencies under the 
PRA.187 He is a named party in five separate cases that have reached 
appellate courts in Washington.188 
Washington courts that have considered procedural questions under 
the PRA189 might have reached the same result had they applied a 
deferential de novo standard.190 While the court in Parmelee v. Clarke 
did not explicitly state that it was presuming the validity of the 
Department of Corrections’ procedural rules, it nonetheless reached its 
conclusion based on the inmate’s failure to comply with the 
department’s rules.191 The court in Neighborhood Alliance did not 
examine whether the county had a procedural rule requiring that the old 
hard drive be searched in connection with a public-records request. If a 
rule governing the internal disposition of public-records requests existed, 
however, and that rule did not call for the public-records officer to notify 
the computer technicians who possessed the hard drive at the time the 
request was made, the court should have evaluated the rule for its 
                                                     
185. Kristi Pihl, Judgment Puts Future of Mesa in Question, TRI-CITY HERALD (Pasco, Wash.), 
Dec. 13, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2009/12/13/828480/judgment-puts-
future-of-mesa-in.html.  
186. Id. 
187. Rob Tucker, Man Takes Records Fight Regionwide, NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, Wash.), Apr. 
21, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.thenewstribune.com/2008/04/21/340472/federal-way-man-
has-won-thousands.html. 
188. City of Federal Way v. Koenig, 167 Wash. 2d 341, 217 P.3d 1172 (2009); Koenig v. City of 
Des Moines, 158 Wash. 2d 173, 142 P.3d 162 (2006); Koenig v. City of Lakewood, No. 37761-6-II, 
2009 WL 1864001 (Wash. Ct. App. June 30, 2009) (unpublished opinion); Koenig v. Pierce 
County, 151 Wash. App. 221, 211 P.3d 423 (2009); West v. Port of Olympia, 146 Wash. App. 108, 
192 P.3d 926 (2008). 
189. See supra Part IV.C.  
190. Id. 
191. See supra notes 166–171 and accompanying text. 
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reasonableness. Finally, the court in Zink based its decision at least in 
part on the statutory provision requiring that the city’s offices be open 
between certain hours to allow the public to inspect public records and 
requiring that the city not discriminate among requesters. Even under the 
more deferential standard suggested here, the Zink court may have 
reached the same conclusion because the city violated a clear provision 
in the PRA. 
CONCLUSION 
In its 1992 amendments to the Public Records Act, the Legislature 
stated that “[t]he people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the 
agencies that serve them.”192 The PRA is designed to reflect this 
relationship between the people and the government they create to serve 
them. The presumption favoring disclosure encourages the broad access 
to public records and minimizes government secrecy. There is some 
danger, however, in subjecting every regulation and rule adopted under 
the PRA to the strictest scrutiny. Agencies and members of the public 
alike will be increasingly unsure of what they must do to comply with 
the Act’s mandate. As a result, and for the sake of consistency with the 
rest of administrative and municipal law, courts should presume the 
validity of an agency procedural rule unless an adverse requester can 
show that the rule is unreasonable. 
 
                                                     
192. Act of Mar. 31, 1992, ch. 139, § 2, 1992 Wash. Sess. Laws 559, 564 (codified at WASH. 
REV. CODE § 42.56.030 (2008)). 
